# El modelo de Melitz (2003) Firmas y Comercio Internacional

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# Melitz (2003)

- Melitz (2003) develops a model that can successfully explain many of the firm-level features seen in the previous slides
- Main features:
  - Firms are heterogeneous in productivity
  - Fixed costs of exporting
- Main implications:
  - Only the most productive firms export
  - Trade liberalization reallocates market shares towards most productive firms
  - ► This reallocation works like an increase in industry's productivity

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#### Demand

Representative consumer has CES preferences

$$U = \left[ \int_{\omega \in \Omega} q(\omega)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} d\omega \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}}$$

where  $\Omega$  is the set of available varieties

Consumers maximize U subject to

$$\int_{\omega} p(\omega) q(\omega) d\omega = R$$

• This yields demand for individual variety  $\omega$ :

$$q(\omega) = \left[\frac{p(\omega)}{P}\right]^{-\sigma} \frac{R}{P}$$

where P is the CES price index

$$P = \left[ \int_{\omega} p(\omega)^{1-\sigma} d\omega \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

- ullet There is a continuum of firms each producing a different variety  $\omega$
- One factor of production, labor, inelastically supplied at its aggregate level L
- There are increasing returns to scale in production:

$$I = f + \frac{q}{\varphi}$$

All firms share the same fixed cost of production f but have different productivity levels indexed by  $\varphi > 0$ 

• Each firm's constant marginal cost is given by

$$MC(\varphi) = \frac{w}{\varphi}$$

where w is the wage from now normalized to one

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- ullet All firms face a residual demand curve with elasticity  $\sigma$
- All firms set the same markup over marginal cost

$$p(\varphi) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{1}{\varphi}$$

ullet Firm revenue and profit are determined by arphi and aggregate variables:

$$r(\varphi) = R \left( P \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \varphi \right)^{\sigma - 1}$$
$$\pi(\varphi) = \frac{1}{\sigma} r(\varphi) - f$$

 Note that more productive firms have higher output and higher revenues

$$\frac{q(\varphi_1)}{q(\varphi_2)} = \left(\frac{\varphi_1}{\varphi_2}\right)^{\sigma} \text{ and } \frac{r(\varphi_1)}{r(\varphi_2)} = \left(\frac{\varphi_1}{\varphi_2}\right)^{\sigma-1}$$

- Variable profits (gross of fixed costs) are proportional to revenues for all firms (hence also increase in  $\varphi$ )
- ullet Higher arphi implies higher revenue productivity, which is typically the measured firm-level productivity

$$\frac{r(\varphi)}{l(\varphi)} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \left[ 1 - \frac{f}{l(\varphi)} \right]$$

- $\blacktriangleright$  Crucial to take fixed costs into account revenue per variable input is independent of  $\varphi$
- $\bullet$  The model could be reinterpreted as  $\varphi$  representing differences in quality rather than in costs

## Aggregation

- An equilibrium will be characterized by:
  - ► Mass M of firms
  - Distribution  $\mu(\varphi)$  of productivity levels
- Since all firms with productivity  $\varphi$  charge the same price  $p(\varphi)$  the price index can be written as

$$P = \left[ \int_0^\infty p(\varphi)^{1-\sigma} M\mu(\varphi) d\varphi \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

• Given  $\mu(\varphi)$  define a weighted average of  $\varphi$  as

$$\widetilde{\varphi} \equiv \left( E \left[ \varphi^{\sigma - 1} \right] \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}} = \left[ \int_{0}^{\infty} \varphi^{\sigma - 1} \mu \left( \varphi \right) d\varphi \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}}$$

### Aggregation

•  $\widetilde{\varphi}$  summarizes all the information in  $\mu\left(\varphi\right)$  relevant for aggregate variables:

$$P = M^{1/(1-\sigma)} p(\widetilde{\varphi}) \qquad R = PQ = Mr(\widetilde{\varphi})$$

$$Q = M^{\sigma/(\sigma-1)} q(\widetilde{\varphi}) \qquad \Pi = M\pi(\widetilde{\varphi})$$

ullet  $\widetilde{arphi}$  represents aggregate productivity

## Entry and Exit

#### Assumptions

- Firms are identical prior to entry and must pay a fixed investment cost  $f_e$  to enter
- Upon entry firms draw a productivity level  $\varphi$  from a common distribution  $g(\varphi)$
- After observing their productivity firms decide whether to exit or to remain active
- $\bullet$  Firms remaining active face a constant probability  $\delta$  of a bad shock that would force them to exit

# Entry and Exit

#### Implications

- In a stationary equilibrium, a firm either exits immediately or produces and earns the same profit  $\pi\left(\varphi\right)$  each period
- Given a realization of  $\varphi$ , expected value of a firm (no time discounting) is

$$v\left(arphi
ight) = \max\left\{0, \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (1-\delta)^t \, \pi\left(arphi
ight)
ight\} = \max\left\{0, \frac{\pi\left(arphi
ight)}{\delta}
ight\}$$

• There exists a unique productivity cutoff  $\varphi^*$  such that firms with  $\varphi \geq \varphi^*$  produce and firms with  $\varphi < \varphi^*$  exit

$$\pi\left(\varphi^{*}\right)=0$$

## Entry and Exit

• Distribution of active firms  $\mu(\varphi)$  will be given by the conditional of  $g(\varphi)$  on  $[\varphi^*, \infty)$ 

$$\mu\left(\varphi\right) = \begin{cases} \frac{g(\varphi)}{1 - G(\varphi^*)} & \text{if } \varphi \ge \varphi^* \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

• This defines the aggregate productivity  $\widetilde{\varphi}$  as a function of the cutoff  $\varphi^*$ :

$$\widetilde{arphi}\left(arphi^{st}
ight)=\left[rac{1}{1-\mathit{G}\left(arphi^{st}
ight)}\int_{arphi^{st}}^{\infty}arphi^{\sigma-1}\!\mathsf{g}\left(arphi
ight)\mathsf{d}arphi
ight]^{rac{1}{\sigma-1}}$$

## Free Entry Condition

- Let  $\overline{\pi} = \Pi/M$  denote the average profits per period across all active firms
- Free entry requires that the expected profits are equal to the fixed cost of entry:

$$0 imes G\left(arphi^{st}
ight)+rac{\overline{\pi}}{\delta} imes\left[1-G\left(arphi^{st}
ight)
ight]=f_{\mathsf{e}}$$

Free Entry condition (FE):

$$\overline{\pi} = rac{\delta f_e}{1 - G\left(arphi^*
ight)}$$

• If firms are less likely to survive (higher  $\varphi^*$ ), they need to be compensated with higher average profits (higher  $\overline{\pi}$ )

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### Zero Cutoff Profit Condition

• Definition of  $\varphi^*$  can be manipulated to yield another relationship between  $\varphi^*$  and  $\overline{\pi}$ 

$$\pi(\varphi^*) = 0 \Leftrightarrow r(\varphi^*) = \sigma f$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \overline{r} = r(\widetilde{\varphi}) = \left(\frac{\widetilde{\varphi}}{\varphi^*}\right)^{\sigma - 1} r(\varphi^*) = \left(\frac{\widetilde{\varphi}}{\varphi^*}\right)^{\sigma - 1} \sigma f$$

$$\overline{\pi} = \pi(\widetilde{\varphi}) = \frac{r(\widetilde{\varphi})}{\sigma} - f = f \left[\left(\frac{\widetilde{\varphi}}{\varphi^*}\right)^{\sigma - 1} - 1\right]$$

The last expression is the Zero Cutoff Profit condition (ZCP):


$$\overline{\pi} = f \left[ \left( \frac{\widetilde{\varphi} \left( \varphi^* \right)}{\varphi^*} \right)^{\sigma - 1} - 1 \right]$$

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### Zero Cutoff Profit Condition

- As  $\varphi^* \uparrow$  two effects on average profits:
  - $\pi \uparrow$  because there are more productive firms on average in the market and they have higher profits
  - $ightharpoonup \overline{\pi} \downarrow$  because other firms are more productive, there is more competition (lower price index)
- Whether ZCP is upward or downward sloping depends on the distribution of firms:
  - If right tail is thick enough (lots of very productive firms) then downward sloping
    - \* True for commonly used distributions
  - ▶ For a special case of Pareto distribution the ZCP is flat because  $\tilde{\varphi}/\varphi^*$  is constant

## Autarky Equilibrium



## Autarky Equilibrium

- ullet FE and ZCP conditions uniquely determine  $\overline{\pi}$  and  $arphi^*$
- ullet Last endogenous variable to be determined is the measure of firms M
  - ▶ L = total expenditure = total revenues = R
  - $ightharpoonup R = M\overline{r}$

  - $M = \frac{L}{\sigma(\overline{\pi}+f)}$

#### **Trade**

- Without trade costs all active firms export and industry productivity is not affected by trade ( $\tilde{\varphi}$  fixed)
- With only variable trade costs would still get counterfactual prediction that all firms exports
- To achieve self-selection into exporting the model needs fixed costs of exporting
  - In order to export firm needs to pay an additional fixed cost  $f_x$  after learning its productivity  $\varphi$
- Include standard iceberg costs:
  - ightharpoonup Need to send au units for one unit to arrive
- Consider a world with n + 1 symmetric countries (n is # countries different to home)
  - Asymmetric case difficult to handle analytically in the full generality of the model

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- Firm with productivity  $\varphi$ 
  - ► Sets price  $p = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma 1} \frac{1}{\omega}$  on domestic market
  - ▶ Earn revenues  $r_d(\varphi) = R(P\varphi^{\sigma-1})^{\sigma-1}$  from domestic sales
- If the firm chooses to export to a particular market
  - Sets export price  $p_x = \tau \frac{\sigma}{\sigma 1} \frac{1}{\omega}$
  - ► Earn export revenues  $r_x(\varphi) = \tau^{1-\sigma} R_x \left( P_x \varphi \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \right)^{\sigma-1}$
- Given symmetry  $P = P_x$ ,  $R = R_x$ 
  - If a firm exports, it exports to all countries
- Then:

$$\pi_d(\varphi) = \frac{r_d(\varphi)}{\sigma} - f, \quad \pi_{\mathsf{x}}(\varphi) = \frac{r_{\mathsf{x}}(\varphi)}{\sigma} - f_{\mathsf{x}}$$

#### Cutoffs

- Now we need to find:
  - ▶ Domestic cutoff  $\varphi^*$
  - Exporting cutoff φ\*,
- Exporting cutoff  $\varphi_{\star}^*$  is such that  $\pi_{\star}(\varphi_{\star}^*)=0$

$$\frac{\tau^{1-\sigma} r_d \left(\varphi_x^*\right)}{\sigma} - f_x = 0$$

$$\frac{\tau^{1-\sigma} r_d \left(\varphi^*\right)}{\sigma} \left(\frac{\varphi_x^*}{\varphi^*}\right)^{\sigma-1} - f_x = 0$$


$$\tau^{1-\sigma} f \left(\frac{\varphi_x^*}{\varphi^*}\right)^{\sigma-1} - f_x = 0$$

$$\varphi_x^* = \varphi^* \tau \left(\frac{f_x}{f}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}$$

so we just need to find  $\varphi^*$ 

• Assume that  $\tau^{\sigma-1}f_x > f$  so that  $\varphi_x^* > \varphi^*$ 

## Selection into Exports



### Cutoffs

- We need to find (ZCP)<sup>T</sup> and FE under trade
- Define:
  - ightharpoons  $\widetilde{arphi}\left(arphi^{*}
    ight)$  average productivity of producing firms
  - $ightharpoonup \widetilde{\varphi}_{x}\left( \varphi_{x}^{st}
    ight)$  average productivity of exporting firms
- Average profits now depend on domestic and export profits:

$$\overline{\pi} = \pi_d\left(\widetilde{\varphi}\right) + p_{\mathsf{X}} n \pi_{\mathsf{X}}\left(\widetilde{\varphi}_{\mathsf{X}}\right)$$

where  $p_x$  is the probability of exporting  $=\frac{1-G(\varphi_x^*)}{1-G(\varphi^*)}$ 


### **Equilibrium Conditions**

ullet Zero cutoff profit condition under trade (ZCP)<sup>T</sup> is:

$$\overline{\pi} = f\left[\left(\frac{\widetilde{\varphi}\left(\varphi^{*}\right)}{\varphi^{*}}\right)^{\sigma-1} - 1\right] + p_{\mathsf{X}} n f_{\mathsf{X}} \left[\left(\frac{\widetilde{\varphi}_{\mathsf{X}}\left(\varphi^{*}\right)}{\varphi_{\mathsf{X}}^{*}\left(\varphi^{*}\right)}\right)^{\sigma-1} - 1\right]$$


Free-entry condition is the same:


$$\overline{\pi} = rac{\delta f_e}{1 - G\left(arphi^*
ight)}$$



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- Trade causes some of the least productive firms to exit:  $\varphi^* > \varphi_a^*$  (where  $\varphi_a^*$  is the production cutoff under autarky)
  - ▶ Demand faced by firms that can export ↑
  - ▶ Demand for labor by these firms ↑
  - ▶ Real wage ↑
  - Less productive firms cannot afford to pay wage and exit
- In domestic market every firm's profits ↓ because of entry of productive exporters from abroad
- Exporters: only most productive gain overall
  - gain in export market
  - lose in domestic market





# Impact of Trade (I)

- Measure of domestic firms decreases but the overall product variety rises:
  - ▶ Number of domestic firms can be computed again as:

$$L = M\overline{r} \Rightarrow L = M(r_d(\widetilde{\varphi}) + p_x n r_x(\widetilde{\varphi}_x))$$

$$M = \frac{L}{\sigma(\pi_d(\widetilde{\varphi}) + f + p_x n \pi_x(\widetilde{\varphi}_x) + p_x n f_x)}$$

$$M = \frac{L}{\sigma(\overline{\pi} + f + p_x n f_x)}$$

Number of varieties available for consumers is simply:  $M_t = M + M_x = M + p_x M = (1 + p_x) M$ 

# Impact of Trade (II)

- Aggregate productivity increases
  - ▶ Total average productivity can be measured as:

$$\widetilde{\varphi}_{t} = \left[\frac{1}{M_{t}} \left( M \widetilde{\varphi}^{\sigma-1} + M_{X} \left( \frac{\widetilde{\varphi}_{X}}{\tau} \right)^{\sigma-1} \right) \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}$$

▶ In terms of aggregation,  $\widetilde{\varphi}_t$  satisfies the same properties of  $\widetilde{\varphi}_a$  under autarky, so the price index can be rewritten as:

$$P = M_t^{1/(1-\sigma)} rac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \left(rac{1}{\widetilde{arphi}_t}
ight)$$

# Impact of Trade (III)

- Welfare (W) unambiguously rises
  - ▶ Measure of welfare is real wage:  $W = 1/P = M_t^{1/(\sigma-1)} \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \left(\widetilde{\varphi}_t\right)$
  - ▶ The gains from trade can be computed as:  $\frac{W}{W_a} 1$  where:

$$\frac{W}{W_a} = \left(\frac{M_t}{M_a}\right)^{1/(\sigma-1)} \frac{(\widetilde{\varphi}_t)}{(\widetilde{\varphi}_a)}$$

► Gains from trade: Gains for increase in variety + gains for improved productivity (models with variable mark-ups can display pro-competitive effects).